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Abstract
This article examines the current state of professionalism in national
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security intelligence analysis in the U.S. Government. Since the
introduction of major intelligence reforms directed by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December, 2004, we
have seen notable strides in many aspects of intelligence
professionalization, including in analysis. But progress is halting, uneven,
and by no means permanent. To consolidate its gains, and if it is to
continue improving, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) should commit
itself to accomplishing a new program of further professionalization of
analysis to ensure that it will develop an analytic cadre that is fully
prepared to deal with the complexities of an emerging multipolar and
highly dynamic world that the IC itself is forecasting. Some recent
reforms in intelligence analysis can be assessed against established
standards of more fully developed professions; these may well fall short
of moving the IC closer to the more fully professionalized analytical
capability required for producing the kind of analysis needed now by the
United States.
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Introduction1 
Since the introduction of major intelligence reforms directed by the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December, 
2004, we have seen notable strides in many aspects of intelligence 
professionalization, including analysis. But progress is halting, uneven, and 
by no means permanent.  To consolidate its gains—and if it is to continue 
improving—the U.S. intelligence community (IC) should commit itself to 
accomplishing a new program of further professionalization of analysis.  
While the progress made in the decade since the passage of IRTPA is notably 
encouraging, we believe it will fall well short of developing the kind of analytic 
cadre that will be needed to deal with the complexities of an emerging 
multipolar and highly dynamic world that the IC anticipates it will be facing.2   
 
When recent reforms in intelligence analysis are assessed against established 
standards of more fully developed professions, it is clear that a fully 
professionalized analysis capability remains a distant goal.  This article 
assesses U.S. intelligence analysis as a nascent profession against other more 
fully developed professions.  It argues for an intensified and sustained effort 
to emulate key criteria and rigorous standards that have proven effective in 
the professionalization of other disciplines.  While the focus here is on 
intelligence analysis for national security, some aspects are also relevant to 
analysis in law enforcement, competitive intelligence for the private sector, 
and possibly for other nations whose intelligence services operate similarly to 
those in the United States. 
 
Professionalization of analysis, toward which many practitioners have spent 
the past decade working, has become a major contributor to both the quality 
and utility of analysis.  Signs of progress can be seen in nearly all the major 
characteristics of what constitutes a true discipline. There have been 
impressive strides in analytic tradecraft (the methodology of intelligence 
                                                     
1 The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of 
the Central Intelligence Agency or any other U.S. Government organization.  This article 
has been reviewed by the CIA’s Publication Review Board to ensure it contains no 
classified information.  The authors thank the Journal’s anonymous reviewers for their 
for their incisive and constructive critiques that much improved this submission.  This 
article is based on conclusions reached in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.),  
Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners Perspectives, 2nd ed., 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univesrsity Press, 2014), especially chapter 20. 
2 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, 
D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, December 2012). 
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analysis), intelligence training and education, community-wide knowledge 
management, and analytic standards. Indeed, professionalization is 
continuing and perhaps even accelerating in some areas.  Although this 
progress remains uneven across the U.S. intelligence community, recent 
milestones are real pace-setters:  
 
 The National Intelligence University (NIU)—once only a virtual one—
is now a bricks-and-mortar institution operated by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency.  Shortly moving to Bethesda, Maryland with plans 
for program expansion, NIU has incorporated a variety of accredited 
degree programs previously offered by the National Defense 
Intelligence College.3 
 
 Until recently, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) has offered sound introductory intelligence analysis training 
to analysts across the community. This has been particularly 
important for standardizing analytic tradecraft and standards across 
the IC, and for smaller and more resource-limited agencies not able to 
provide it for themselves. (IC-sponsored analyst training has recently 
suffered cutbacks due to budget pressures). 
 
 The  creation of the I-Space has facilitated collaboration and the 
Library of National Intelligence (LNI) has begun the cataloguing, 
sharing, and retrieval of intelligence-based information.4 
 
 Some agencies have begun advanced intelligence tradecraft training 
and specialization, which in some cases suggests a step toward 
certifying analysts as being eligible to enter a more selective group of 
senior analysts whose skills have been demonstrated as fully 
proficient.   
 
 The development of specific standards for analyst competencies in 
core, tradecraft, and subject matter expertise is recently underway 
                                                     
3 A brief summary of  NIU and major agencies’ analyst training programs is found in 
Mark M. Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts,” in George 
and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2014), pp. 305-306. 
4 See Thomas Fingar, “Building a Community of Analysts,” in George and Bruce (eds), 
Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 17, for a survey of recent DNI-driven 
accomplishments in IC analysis.  
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within the ODNI, DIA, and the law enforcement community, an 
important prerequisite to anticipated analyst certification.5 
 
As the intelligence community has moved forward with such reforms, the 
debate over the meaning and significance of “professionalization” has 
progressed as well.  Scholars such as Stephen Marrin have articulated that 
practitioners of intelligence analysis have not moved quickly enough to adopt 
needed characteristics of the legal or medical professions.  Moreover, he 
rightly laments the gap between these practitioners and intelligence studies 
scholars, which prevents practicing analysts from learning from the hard-won 
lessons gleaned from serious historical study of past intelligence operations 
and assessments.6  
 
Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline? 7   
Certainly the growth of intelligence studies has been remarkable.  One 
measure is the annual International Studies Association meeting, which in 
2014, for example, featured nearly 20 panels focused on all aspects of 
intelligence, with representation from U.S. and foreign intelligence services as 
well as many university scholars.8  Other practitioner-scholars have also 
remarked on the need to move further along the path of professionalization if 
analytic performance is to improve.  For example, some practitioners have 
argued that intelligence analysis, in comparison with medicine and law, is a 
nascent profession that will require time to develop key attributes such as a 
distinct literature, certification, governing boards, and knowledge 
                                                     
5 Most progress has been made in analytic tradecraft; see ODNI Intelligence Community 
Directive 203, 2 January 2015 (first issued in 2007); also ODNI, ICS 610-7, Oct. 2010.  
See also the Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Analytic Standards, April, 2012.  
These standards are largely the product of the International Association of Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA), an important new professional 
organization.  Within the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence 
issues broad Intelligence Community Directives on how agencies should conduct their 
activities across a wide array of  intelligence functions.  These ICDs are published 
throughout the community and used by individual agencies as guidance for their own 
activities.  Mostly accessible as unclassified, they are compilied on the DNI website, 
available at: http://www.dni.gov.    
6 Stephen Marrin,  Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between 
Scholarship and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 4-5. A related study 
addressing private sector competitive intelligence is Craig S. Fleisher, “Are Competitive 
Intelligence Practitioners Professionals?” in Craig S. Fleisher and David L. Blenkhorn 
(eds.), Controversies in Competitive Intelligence: The Enduring Issues (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2003).  
7 See Rebecca Fisher, Rob Johnston, and Peter Clement, “Is Intelligence Analysis a 
Discipline?” in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 4.  
8 See the International Studies Association website, available at:  
http://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Toronto2014/Program.aspx. 
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management.9  However, professionalization of intelligence analysis entails 
more than subject matter expertise, but rather involves good understanding 
of the operation and practice of intelligence itself, including the collection 
requirements and exploitation process, the epistemology and tradecraft 
required for accurate and reliable analysis, and the national security 
decisionmaking process which intelligence analysis can ably support—or 
entirely miss the mark.   
 
A key premise is that professionalization will improve the quality and 
relevance of  intelligence.  Marrin rightly argues that the lack of 
professionalization has resulted in wide variation in analytic competence and 
an overall diminution in the role that analysis could play in decision-
making.10  Studies of intelligence failures also highlight impairments caused 
by collection gaps, foreign denial and deception, misinterpretation of 
information, and faulty analytic assumptions. Inadequate warning and feeble 
or off-target analysis provided to decisionmakers is the result.11  These 
sources of intelligence failure often lie at the heart of why policymakers can 
feel justified when they disregard or dispute analytic judgments.   They also 
imply major professional deficiencies in the conduct of analysis. The reported 
release of a recent National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan – described 
as markedly gloomy in the press – was greeted by some White House officials 
as simply “a view,” and not necessarily the determining one.12  This suggests 
less than full confidence in the professionalism of intelligence among the 
most important users of its products.   
 
Analysis for Decision Advantage 
Solid and insightful intelligence analysis can provide support to decision-
making of national leaders and operators in the field who execute our 
diplomatic and military strategies.  Decision advantage—that is, the ability to 
give the United States an information advantage to enable the use of national 
power more quickly and wisely than others—has become even more 
important in today’s globalized world of 24/7 communications and 
interdependency.13  As intelligence analysts become more proficient in 
                                                     
9  Fisher, Johnston, and Clement, cited in note 7 above.   
10 Marrin,  Improving Intelligence Analysis, p. 132.  
11 See George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 10. 
12 Ernesto Londono, Karen DeYoung, and Greg Miller,  “Afghanistan Gains Will be 
Quickly Lost After the Drawdown, US Intelligence Warns,”  Washington Post, December 
28, 2003. 
13 See Jennifer Sims, “Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis,” in the 
Oxford Handbook on National Security Intelligence,  (ed.) Loch Johnson (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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providing informed judgments and reliable forecasts, they become more 
indispensible in directing the smart use of U.S national power.  Senior 
commanders have come to rely on intelligence analysis as being an integral 
part of their understanding the physical as well as virtual battlefields.  
Likewise, national level leaders need analysis to comprehend not only the 
“facts” as we know them, but also to assess uncertainties of complex 
international developments so they can carefully weigh the risks of taking or 
rejecting specific actions.  Increasingly, as the United States has to make 
resource choices on what military strategies and programs to develop, which 
diplomatic crises to engage in, or what contingency plans to prepare, 
intelligence can help to assess the urgency, signficance, and consequences or 
risks those decisions might entail.   
 
Analysis for the 21st Century 
Policymakers are likely to become even more reliant on intelligence as their 
decisions become more complex, with more second- and third-order 
consequences that are harder to foresee.  But good analysis will be challenged 
by declining resources and growing complexity of the problems that 
policymakers will have to face: 
 
Fiscal Constraints 
Winston Churchill once said:  “We have run out of money, so now we have to 
think.”   As is evident in recent American fiscal and budgetary crises, we are in 
an era when resources will be more constrained than the previous decade of 
rapid budget growth.   Plans are underway to reduce spending for the coming 
years that may jeopardize analysis.  The total intelligence budget has 
decreased two years in a row, falling four percent overall.14  Additional cuts 
will surely continue.    
 
Traditionally, training and outreach efforts are routinely treated as  
expendable, rather than reducing other “mission essential” operations.  
However, we believe that improved analysis based on more professional 
training and education as well as interaction with outside scholars and 
experts can be a key force multiplier for reduced U.S. military and foreign 
affairs budgets. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 Pam Benson, “Intelligence Budget Continues to Drop,”  CNN Security Blog, October 
30, 2012, Testimony of James Clapper Before the Congress, available at: 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/30/intelligence-budget-drops-for-first-time-
since-911/. 
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Shifting Global Power 
Another major challenge facing the United States is the dynamic international 
environment.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey 
has described the future as an “increasingly competitive environment” 
marked by persistent conflict.15  DNI James Clapper’s 2013 worldwide brief to 
the congressional oversight committees likewise stressed the unpredictability 
of the current environment, and the DNI’s 2014 National Intelligence 
Strategy described the security environment as complex and evolving, with 
“extremely dangerous, pervasive, and elusive threats.”16  Reinforcing this, the 
National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Global Trends 2030 describes our 
future world this way:   
 
“The diffusion of power among countries will have a dramatic impact 
by 2030. Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe 
combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, 
military spending, and technological investment. China alone will 
probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United 
States a few years before 2030…. The shift in national power may be 
overshadowed by an even more fundamental shift in the nature of 
power.  Enabled by communications technologies, power will shift 
toward multifaceted and amorphous networks that will form to 
influence state and global actions.  Those countries with some of the 
strongest fundamentals—GDP, population size, etc.—will not be able to 
punch their weight unless they also learn to operate in networks and 
coalitions in a multipolar world.”17 
 
A nation’s learning curve—aided by intelligence—will help establish its place 
in the international pecking order, and do much to shape its relative security 
amid turbulence.  Both the topics and types of analysis will have to shift.     
 
                                                     
15 Martin Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, February 2012, p. 
6, available at:  
http://www.public.navy.mil/donhr/Documents/Strategic%20Plans/CJCS%20Strategic
%20Direction%20to%20the%20Joint%20Force.pdf.  
16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper Testimony Before the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, March 5, 2013; The National Intelligence Strategy 
of the United States of America, Sept. 18, 2014, p. 4.  Both available at 
http://www.dni.gov.   
17 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 
2012 (Washington: Director of National Intelligence), Executive Summary,  iii. 
 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss3/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.3.1454
  
7 
 
Additionally, so-called “wicked problems” such as global climate change, 
crisis-driven mass migrations, healthcare, pandemics, nuclear weapons, 
human and drug trafficking, and social injustice will become routine 
analytical tasks.  But their dimensions are poorly defined, nearly impossible 
to readily solve without a change in attitudes by affected populations, and 
have interdependencies with other critical issues.  Such daunting problems as 
these will demand higher-order intelligence analysis.   Satisfying increasing 
intelligence demands cannot be accomplished without greater 
professionalization and expertise building over the coming decade. 
  
Analysis and the Metrics of Professions 
Attributes of Established Professions  
Established or more mature professions such as law and medicine, as well as 
others such as engineering, accounting, airline pilots, and career military 
service (the “profession of arms”) demonstrate certain attributes that imbue 
their practice—the work of their practitioners—as “professional.”  Six of the 
most important attributes are summarized below.18  They are important for 
their heavy integral presence in mature professions, but relative 
underdevelopment in intelligence analysis:    
    
1. Governing bodies that set quality standards for 
professional performance of their members, for 
example, the American Bar Association and American 
Medical Association whose members cannot practice 
without association membership, or perform at 
substandard levels and still retain membership.  
 
2. Rigorous education and continuous training for 
practitioners throughout the duration their professional 
practice to acquire, sustain, and refine their knowledge 
and skills.  
 
3. Certification requirements that limit admission—
that is, prevent their employment—to only those who 
qualify, and also levy professional growth requirements 
                                                     
18 Fisher, Johnston, and Clement identify most of these attributes, which together 
constitue a “discipline,” in law, medicine and library services, citing extensive literature 
documenting the development of these disciplines, pp. 57-66.  Marrin’s  half-dozen 
attributes of professionalization mostly correspond with ours, but he also includes human 
capital management and ethics.  Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, pp. 134-138.  
See also the standard Ernest Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” Social Work 2 
(July 1957): 45-55; cited in Lowenthal, in Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, p. 317.  
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on career practitioners in order to continue their 
practice.  
 
4. Knowledge management systems to organize 
information in their domains such as West’s Key 
Number system for lawyers, the National Library of 
Medicine and the Medical Subject Heading index for 
MDs, and Dewey’s Decimal System for librarians, and to 
facilitate information retrieval and expansion. 
 
5. Systematic, rigorous, and reliable research methods 
to build and advance durable knowledge.  And  
 
6. Institutionalized lessons-learned or best practices 
studies conducted to support continuous organizational 
learning.  
 
Assessing Analysis  
How well does intelligence analysis stack up when assessed by these 
attributes?  In general, initial steps are promising, but preliminary and 
unsteady.  Specifically, while we can see notable progress in the direction of 
professsionalization as identified in the attributes of the more mature 
professions cited above, it is also clear that intelligence analysis remains some 
distance from professional maturity as seen in such professions as law and 
medicine.  What follows are some notable highlights and shortfalls on the 
path to professionalizing analysis:    
 
1. Governing bodies:  The ODNI has begun to establish IC-wide standards 
in Intelligence Community Directives ICD 203 (analytic standards) and ICD 
610 (competencies for professionals), and in Intelligence Community 
Standards ICS 610-7 (needed competency standards for analysts).  However, 
the DNI has no real authority to set or enforce IC-wide standards.  In practice, 
analysts’ governing bodies are their agency or component management 
chains.  In general, most agency leadership and management chains seem 
discernibly more interested in short-term analytic production than in longer-
term development of analytic professionalization.   A commited leadership 
would have to make professionalization goals specific, and implement metrics 
or other measures of effectiveness to assess and monitor progress toward that 
goal.  Promotion boards would have to include senior trainers or managers 
more focused on technique and insight than on production files.  An IC-wide 
issue, professionalization will require a substantial commitment not only 
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within the ODNI, but also from intelligence managers in the agencies, and at 
all levels, from first-line managers through the senior ranks.19 
 
2. Training and education:  The new National Intelligence University 
(NIU) represents a promising start, but little available evidence suggests any 
connection between curricular development and analytic professionalization.    
To our knowledge, there is little specific “analyst” track of courses with 
established standards designed to achieve a specific level of analytic 
sophistication.   Individual agency-developed training programs vary 
enormously in scope, depth, duration, and quality; some agencies support 
new analyst training for several months and some shorter mid-career courses 
in advanced analysis that qualify analysts for more senior positions, while 
other agencies offer almost none or very tailored training that does not 
directly support a well-rounded, “complete” analyst.  Such professional 
development seems at best implicit and ad hoc. 
 
3. Certification:  The IC has barely begun in this area.  The ODNI could take 
the lead in both certification and in developing an analytic governing body at 
the IC level, but centralization may be controversial.  Some agencies are 
entertaining the concept of analyst certification, but rather than having it 
done independently, there should be some overall, IC-wide, direction given to 
agencies to set and meet some common standards.  Entrance to the analytic 
cadre, like any other intelligence occupational speciality, requires security 
certification.  But competency or standards in the performance of analysis are 
not yet tested in the IC, and no real certification process beyond routine and 
agency-specific periodic performance appraisals affects entrance to or ability 
to stay in the analytic ranks.20  
 
4. Knowledge Management: The National Intelligence Library (NLI) 
represents a tentative but promising start, but security classification levels 
and need-to-know criteria impose daunting limits on information access and 
retrieval by analysts.  Comprehensive knowledge management in intelligence 
                                                     
19 The role of management in analysis, especially its professionalization, is central, 
understated, and little understood.  See John A. Gentry, “Managers of Analysts: The 
Other Half of Intelligence Analysis,” Intelligence and National Security, 2014; available 
at:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.961244.  See also John C. Gannon, 
“Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing 
Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2008), chapter 13.    
20 The International Association for Intelligence Education  (IAFIE) has begun an effort 
to certify courses and programs in training and education, but not practicing analysts.  
See the IAFIE website at: http://www.iafie.org.   
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can never be fully implemented similarly to unclassified disciplines such as 
law or medicine, and the Snowden and Manning disclosures highlight the 
risks of internal repositories to the insider threat, and make advances more 
difficult.  Better use of unclassified work by intelligence scholars as well as 
additional leeway in reaching out to non-government experts would assist in 
having more readily available resources for analysts. 
 
5. Research methods:  Major strides in the tradecraft, i.e., methodology, of 
intelligence analysis have been made since 2000, especially in the 
development and training of structured analytic techniques, and in growing 
acceptance of their use in finished intelligence products.  The use of tradecraft 
groups to support line analysis is also now gaining acceptance in some 
agencies, and others have expressed growing interest in this form of 
methodological advancement.  Still, current training in analytic methods 
reflects a largely cookbook approach to practical application (how to do it).  
The IC should move toward training programs that develop a deeper 
understanding of the epistemological rationale for such tradecraft.  It should 
also bring into play the power of social and behavioral theories, now largely 
absent in intelligence analysis.  Such theories can highlight hidden 
relationships, generate untested hypotheses, and help connect intelligence 
studies with other fields of social and political inquiry in building knowledge 
and understanding.21   
 
6. Learning organizations: Organizations must learn just as individuals 
do.  Lessons-learned to identify best practices (and prevent bad ones) is only 
recent to the IC (CIA’s formal effort began only 10 years ago), but this effort 
appears to have not yet reached critical mass. It has not yet been 
systematically adopted throughout the IC, nor has its potential value even 
begun to be realized by agencies.  Courses in intelligence successes and 
failures have been offered over the years, but any “lessons” are still largely 
implicit and applied superficially to analysis, if at all, and are not yet 
institutionalized in a way to support learning organizations.  Despite the 
classified publication of several relevant studies of analytic failures and 
successes, few practicing analysts seem aware of lessons learned from such 
studies of the successes and failures of their predecessors in their own 
agencies much less in others.  More importantly, there is little research 
                                                     
21 See especially the two volume study produced by the National Academy of Sciences, 
National Research Council, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2011); and Baruch Fishhoff and Cherie Chauvin (eds.), 
Intelligence Analysis:  Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2011). 
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conducted routinely of what “best practices” were employed or should have 
been.  The fledgling Lessons Learned center at CIA, for example, has focused 
far more on operational studies than on analytic ones.  In general, the 
Community is hard pressed to identify proven “best practices” learned from 
past analyses as a guide to improving future analysis.  Additionally, periodic 
“analytic line reviews” which some agencies have tried in a limited way also 
have lessons-learned value for both substantive and methodological 
evaluation of a body of analytic reporting on particular topics or issues.   
 
Next Steps in Professionalization 
Given the present state of intelligence analysis as briefly characterized here, 
and guided by both the attributes of established professions and the notable 
gaps they highlight in the emerging profession of analysis, we suggest the 
following five recommendations as measures that can help reduce those gaps.  
Implementation of the following five recommendations can help appreciably 
in advancing the goal of professionalization of intelligence analysis.    
 
Recommendation 1:  A Joint Professional Analysis Education (JPAE) 
Program 
Maximizing the contribution of intelligence analysis to informed national 
security policies will demand that a much higher priority be placed on 
professionalization than presently exists across the intelligence community.  
Not only must current training and education programs be protected from 
ongoing budget cuts, but new and better integrated programs will be needed.  
Something akin to the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system 
of training and certification should be considered as a model for fully 
professionalizing the cadre of intelligence analysts.22  Many of the current 
programs, and indeed the expansion of the National Intelligence University 
campus (and its relocation to Bethesda, proximate to Washington, D.C.), 
would lend themselves to such a long-term objective.  Unlike the profession of 
arms, the profession of analysis has no progressive set of training 
requirements through which all future senior analysts must move.  It would 
be worth considering how the ODNI could develop such a career-long 
program of training and education that would both develop individual  
analysts’ skills and expertise but also create more of a joint analytic culture. 
                                                     
22 See Anne Daugherty Miles, "Thinking Holistically:  PIE in the Sky?" a 2012 IAFIE 
award -winning paper, available at: 
http://www.iafie.org/resource/resmgr/2012_essay/miles_2012_iafie.pdf.  
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Joint Professional Military Education: A Possible Model?   
 
The elaborate system of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is built 
around the “profession of arms,” which began as in the early 1800s, with the 
establishment of the Military Academy at West Point (1802), the Naval Academy 
(1845) and later the Naval War College (1884) and the Army War College (1901).  In 
the twentieth century it blossomed to include other senior service colleges, along 
with specialized command and staff colleges.  
 
As a result of studying the lessons from World Wars I and II, and after considerable 
inter-service consideration, the concept of joint education rather than single-service 
education took hold.  After the Second World War, General Eisenhower and other 
wartime flag officers determined that there was a need for advancing senior officers 
from all the services to be educated together and develop more interagency 
cooperation, and thus, under the auspices of the Joint Staff, the National War 
College was founded in Washington D.C. in 1946.  Since then, the JPME programs 
have expanded well beyond military officers to include senior civilians in the 
national security enterprise as well as senior officers from foreign militaries.  Many 
have become fully accredited degree-granting institutions. 
 
The military leadership has recognized the need to develop professional military 
skills throughout an officer’s career, from basic training courses to specialized 
disciplines (infantry, artillery, air, naval, amphibious, and other operational 
specialties) and ultimately to senior-level education that prepares officers for 
national-level responsibilities.  At the earlier stages of an officer’s career, “skills” 
training is emphasized; however, as the officer is promoted, the JPME objectives 
shift to “educating” the officer into the art of national security strategy development, 
interagency cooperation, and multinational operations.  These steps in the JPME 
ladder are considered prerequisites for promotion to higher commands and 
ultimately to national-level decision-making.  Indeed, the Goldwater Nichols 
Military Reform Act of 1986 makes joint professional military education a statutory 
requirement for promotion to flag-officer rank. 
 
In the course of a 20-year career, an officer can minimally assume two-to-three 
years’ full-time equivalent of training and education, often more.   At particular 
ranks, they undergo specified types of training and education, typically required for 
further advancement.  To be considered for promotion to General or Admiral, 
officers must move out of the field to gain an understanding of the broader national 
security context in which their missions have to be performed, as well as to 
comprehend the roles and missions of other civilian departments and agencies with 
which they will have to work.  The stress on “jointness” – especially since the 
Goldwater-Nichols reforms – has become accepted practice, with other civilian 
agencies also recognizing the importance of their senior officers gaining joint duty 
experiences on the way to executive-level positions of responsibility. 
 
Source: Cynthia Watson, Military Education: A Reference Handbook, 2007  
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In “jointness,” we advocate a common understanding of the analytic 
profession, its attributes, and its standards across the entire IC, analogous to 
the earlier impact of Goldwater-Nichols on the military services and the 
specific intent of IRTPA—not force a homogenization of all analysts that 
removes the unique skills and work practices required for different agencies.   
 
Such a JPAE system need not slavishly copy all aspects of the joint 
professional military education system, but it should strive to integrate the 
varous training programs directed by individual agencies and establish some 
common standards for the training each agency gives its analysts.  
Accordingly, as analysts progress through their careers, different training and 
education goals could be set; at various points in their careers they would be 
assigned to complete those programs in order to advance further in their 
chosen analytic track.  
 
For example, an analyst entering on duty might be expected to take a basic 
analysis course, offered by an individual agency or, if not available there, then 
by the ODNI.  Having completed this entry-level basic training, the analyst 
might then work on an account for a period of time, before next being 
expected to take additional full-time training.  We believe there are several 
areas, where additional training might be considered, which we touch on 
briefly:  
 
Basic Understanding of Epistemology.  Knowledge-building requires that 
analysts understand the basis for what constitutes reliable knowledge or 
information.23  Postmortems of intelligence failures—highlighted most 
recently by the 2002 Iraq WMD NIE—demonstrate  that analysts often rely 
too heavily on unsubstantiated information, merely because it came from 
what had been thought to be either authoritative sources or because it fit a 
current mind-set.  Likewise analysts’ judgments can be swayed by the 
authority of their more senior managers or the organization’s current 
assessment of a problem (the “analytical line”), without considering whether 
such judgments are based on something more empirically or scientifically 
based.  Too few analysts have been schooled in the nature of knowledge or 
think about the basis on which they are reaching conclusions.  Hence, 
concerted attention to basic epistemology that underpins the analytic 
profession should be a foundational element of every analyst’s training.  
 
                                                     
23 See James B. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to 
Intelligence,” in George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 135-155.   
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Science-based analysis.  As part of this training, analysts should be exposed 
to the power of a more science-based production of knowledge.  The only 
proven method of correcting errors in judgment is one which relies on 
hypothesis testing, validation of information, transparency, and peer review.  
Such features afford science uniquely self-correcting techniques.  The trend 
toward using Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) can not only improve 
relibility of analysis, but also accelerate the analytic profession’s advancement 
to becoming a true discipline.  Hand-in-hand with a basic understanding of 
epistemology, the further development of an accessible repository of 
organized, searchable, and retrievable information will facilitate a more 
complete and reliable knowledge-base from which lessons can be learned by 
future generations of analysts.24 
 
Analysis and Collection Disciplines.  A vital area for analyst training will 
provide a deeper understanding of the collection sources on which 
intelligence judgments rest.  As suggested above, too few analysts truly 
understand how they know what they know.  Most are limited by inadequate 
understanding of the methods underlying HUMINT, SIGINT, and GEOINT.  
Too few analysts invest the time needed to grasp the complexities of these 
disciplines or appreciate the strengths, weaknesses, or biases that such 
information sources bring to the analytic process.  More analysts should 
spend time working with the major collection agencies.  Additionally, training 
is needed on how collection systems work, how analysts can best use them, 
and how much confidence to place in the raw intelligence reporting that each 
produces.     
 
Basic Warning Training.  Numerous investigations and postmortems have 
highlighted the classic intelligence warning failures that analysts have 
encountered.  Yet training and education on warning has not kept pace with 
the expanding scope of warning problems, nor  the recent decentralization in 
how the warning function is conducted.  Too few analysts understand warning 
as a principal responsibility, nor understand the warning process and perils 
detailed in the many studies conducted on intelligence failures.  At a 
minimum, basic analytic training should include a focus on the warning 
function, greater understanding of how adversaries might employ denial and 
                                                     
24 This progress will, however, be slowed by the lack of a developed taxonomy of 
intelligence topics and the multiple layers of classification and clearance requirements 
that are part of a “need to know” intelligence culture.  More efforts on these fronts will 
also be needed.   
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deception, and best practices for communicating warning to the broader 
intelligence community and policymakers.    
 
Expertise-building.  Another step in an analyst’s career-long training should 
be expertise-building, clearly an important theme in DCIA Brennan’s 
proposed reorrganization emphasizing Mission Centers.  Fewer analysts today 
are hired at the Ph.D. level, though most have had some courses on their 
regional, country, or functional accounts as part of undergraduate or master’s 
level education.  Some agencies currently offer time-off or tuition-
reimbursement for master’s level graduate studies.  This approach is 
haphazard and does not build expertise in a systematic or planned way.  A 
more regulated educational program of subject matter expertise would expose 
analysts to new analytic methods as well as to leading experts in their fields 
outside the intelligence community.     
 
Senior Service College Experience. A final step in the JPAE might then be 
participation in a year-long CAPSTONE-style course at a senior service 
college, or at an NIU-equivalent program for rising senior analysts.  These 
programs are “joint” by their very nature, as they bring together mid-career 
military and civilian officers from services, the national security agencies, and 
the intelligence community, whose parent agencies expect might become 
future leaders of their instituions.  This year-long exposure to the “whole-of-
government” system would give intelligence analysts an entirely different 
perspective on how they can best serve warriors, diplomats, and law 
enforcement officials as well as the NSC and other very senior customers.  An 
NIU-equivalent program bringing together officers from across the IC would 
have the benefit of creating a more common culture and networks of senior 
officers now more prepared to work collaboratively.25   
 
Recommendation 2:  Standardize and Test Analytic Methods  
Were a JPAE to be established, it would also need to establish a more uniform 
and recognized set of training objectives for all analysts.  One of the key 
attributes of the analytic profession is “how we do our work.”  Analytic 
methods, techniques, and skills are often what set analysts apart from subject 
                                                     
25 In the military system, a CAPSTONE course is offered to those officers selected as flag-
officers, who will need to understand higher-level strategy and will be operating at the 
national-level. The course is of shorter duration (roughly six weeks) than longer-full time 
service college programs, is led by serving and former three-star officers, and each class is 
much smaller, facilitating more of a seminar-style of learning.  The State Department 
once had a similar program, called the Senior Seminar, which drew in promising senior 
foreign services officers as well as select officers from the intelligence community and the 
military.   
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matter experts outside the intelligence community. Many structured analytic 
techniques already exist26 and they should become more utilized across the 
intelligence community.  Structured analytic techniques have also been 
developed for tactical-level military applictions.27  This is happening—slowly 
and unevenly—but it could be further encouraged if the ODNI were to go 
beyond the community-wide standards now in ICD 203 by further developing 
structured analytic tradecraft curricular materials, and courses for those 
agencies not able to support their own analysis training.  Workshops in using 
specific techniques should be ongoing, with the development of case studies 
on specific examples of how a Structured Analytic Technique (SAT) was used, 
with what success—or failure—and why.  Building up a body of SAT case 
studies would not only be a good training tool, but it would also permit more 
evaluation of the techniques themselves.  Indeed, one of the current 
weaknesses of using SATs is that there is almost no research on whether these 
techniques result is more accurate judgments and forecasts, or even more 
insightfiul or useful analysis.28  It should, therefore, be the goal of the ODNI 
to support more research into effective analytic methods, more 
documentation of their utility and limitations, and consideration of how to 
further expand the set of analytic methods used by analysts.   
 
Recommendation 3: A More Robust Lessons-Learned Capability  
The currently modest Lessons Learned capability that CIA and the DNI have 
developed at CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, along with DIA’s 
similar Knowledge Laboratory, have not been widely emulated elsewhere in 
the IC.  And none has the stature of the lessons-learned organizations in the 
military.  It is our distinct impression that this emerging capability has been 
hugely underutilized for learning about and improving analysis.  Thus, there 
would seem to be ample opportunities for a “Lessons Learned” library of 
analytic cases.29  Case study writers could be assigned to an analytic team 
focused on a particular analytic challenge. The case writers would observe the 
analytic process from beginning to end, noting how the analysts collaborated, 
what analytic methods they employed, how they reached judgments, and 
                                                     
26 See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques 
for Intelligence Analysis 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.:  CQ Press, 2015); and their related 
chapter in George and Bruce (eds), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 231-248.  
27 See Stewart, Cukor, Larson, and Pottinger, in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing 
Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 15.   
28 See Marrin, Ibid, pp. 24.  A forthcoming study by the RAND Corporation identifies 
arguments for and against the use of SATs and acknowledges the difficulty of validating 
them.  Based on a pilot study, its prelimimary assessment generally finds that improved 
analysis can result from their use. 
29 See Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph H. Pherson, Cases in Intelligence Analysis: 
Structured Analytic Techniques in Action, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.:  CQ Press, 2014).   
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finally how they delivered their findings to policymakers.  They could also 
follow-up and record the analytic effort’s accuracy and impact, and also 
collect whatever feedback policymakers might be willing to provide.  This 
would be far superior to the past attempts to “evaluate” the quality of a 
product’s analytic tradecraft after the fact, or solicit policymakers’ general 
satisfaction levels with analytic support anecdotally and  typically long after 
the policymaker has forgotten a specific analytical product.30 
 
Recommendation 4:  A New Journal for Intelligence Analysis  
Few true professions exist in the absence of  true professional journals.  New 
findings, new research techniques, or controversial issues can be aired within 
a community of practice.  Such could exist for the intelligence community as 
well.  The ODNI has made good strides in developing more community-wide 
data bases of analysis and enabling greater collaboration among analysts 
across the community.  The technology available today makes this much 
easier both to share as well as retrieve analytic products remotely across both 
time and distance.  The I-Space and Library of National Intelligence analysis 
are two such examples of what is now possible.  No doubt there can be 
additional such initiatives that further exploit technology to improve these 
data bases and make them more user-friendly to a larger number of analysts.  
 
Where the intelligence community might devote more attention, however, is 
in the development of a true “peer review” journal of analytic practices.  
Sherman Kent spoke of this more than 50 years ago.  The closest that the CIA 
and intelligence community have come to this is the Center for the Study of 
Intelligence’s Studies in Intelligence.  This quarterly journal, long published 
in both classified and unclassified issues, has been the principal journal of 
record of what the CIA and other agencies have learned from their operations 
and analysis.  Owing to its largely military interests and readership, the 
American Intelligence Journal, somewhat like the no-longer-published 
Defense Intelligence Journal, is likely to remain, at least for a while, a less 
well-known or cited publication.  Outside the IC, there are two relevant 
academic journals that publish articles on a full range of intelligence topics, to 
include historical cases of operations, analytic issues, historical topics, and 
intelligence-policy challenges,  namely the refereed Intelligence and National 
                                                     
30 A notable exception to this “after-the-fact” feedback, is the way PDB briefers daily 
present intelligence analysis and get new taskings as well as comments on those PDB 
items.  This instant feedback is of course valuable, but seldom can put the contribution of 
such analysis into a broader context of ongoing support on a particular issue, which is 
what a case study might do more systematically.  
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Security and the International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence.   
 
While these publications are important to the general field of intelligence, 
none is fully devoted to the study of analytic methods and practices.  Such a 
journal can become a vehicle for exchanging views on the utility of different 
forms and methods of analysis, on new analytic challenges, or on important 
analytic findings and their implications for the intelligence community.  This 
“Journal of Intelligence Analysis” could fill a gap that presently exists, 
becoming the discussion board for analysts who might take different positions 
on the utility of certain SATs, or have minority views regarding analytic 
judgments reached by most intelligence analysts or agencies.  The periodic 
complaint that not enough research has been conducted on the effectiveness 
of SATs might be better addressed if such a journal were established to 
encourage analysts to share their own experiences using these methods.   
 
Most logically, such a journal could become part of the newly expanding 
National Intelligence University.  Like the National Defense University which 
produces a variety of  publications, including the Joint Forces Quarterly, NIU 
might direct its own academic press to support journals dedicated to analysis 
and possibly other fields of specialization.  It could be a refereed journal 
published in hard copy and available on-line, and include blog-like 
discussions of analytic issues.  Additionally, any classified studies that may 
address how analytic failures can be averted and successes achieved might be 
declassified to facilitate a wider circulation among uncleared researchers not 
in the IC whose “outsider” perspectives could bring value to the discussions.   
 
Like the current Studies in Intelligence, there would be value in producing 
unclassified issues in order to expose analysts’ views to outside examination 
and commentary and, fostering outreach, to invite non-official participants 
into discussions of analysis.  One continuing problem for analysis is its 
insularity owing principally to classification.  Having more contact—another 
form of analytic outreach—with outside experts in both methodology as well 
as substantive expertise would be a desirable objective of such a journal.  It 
would also support a number of university programs in intelligence studies 
which are eager to improve their curricula and make their courses more 
relevant to students aspiring to become intelligence analysts.   
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Recomnmendation 5:  Establish Analyst Entry and Certification 
Processes 
Intelligence analysis is an odd profession as it has historically not been 
one of those “callings” for which students in college take preprofessional 
(such as pre-law or pre-med) training.  Across the country a wide range 
of courses is offered at both undergraduate and graduate levels on 
intelligence and analysis.  While such offerings fall short of established 
professional degree programs, IC analysts can still augment their 
internal training and professional growth through select university 
curricular opportunities, especially at the graduate level.31  This 
“accidental” profession – as one colleague has described it32—could 
benefit if it became more purposeful earlier in an analyst’s career 
development, including in the entry-level requirements as well as the 
standards one must maintain during in one’s career.  Given the broad 
scope of occupational disciplines within professional analysis—military, 
political, economic, S&T, leadership, and now targetting, to speak of the 
broader categories—the notion of a single set of preprofessional 
educational requirements for an incoming analyst is perhaps too 
narrow.   
 
A successful WMD analyst, for example, might have entered with a degree in 
chemistry, biology, or even political science depending on which aspects of 
WMD he or she might be following.  However, any analyst expecting to focus 
on the foreign policy aspects of even a functional issue like WMD should be 
able to demonstrate an interest, if not a specialization, in national security 
affairs, foreign countries and languages.  So, developing a profile of  an 
applicant who might mature into a successful analyst could include not only 
their proficiency in their own academic discipline, but also in their general 
knowledge of the world and their analytic skills.33  Individual agencies now 
require online applications, possibly writing samples, and documentation of 
                                                     
31 The International Association For Intelligence Education (IAFIE, cited in note 20) was 
formed in 2004 bringing together several hundred scholars, practitioners and teachers of 
intelligence analysis.  They represent colleges and universities whose offerings range from 
a single course on intelligence to a “minor” or “certificate” in intelligence studies.  
Analysis is often addressed in these programs. 
32 See Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts,” in George and 
Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 304.   
33 To get the right blend of general world affairs knowledge on top of an area 
specialization, agencies might consider a general “entrance exam” along the lines of the 
type currently used by the U.S. Foreign Service.   
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applicants’ experience or skills that are appropriate to the analytic profession 
could support professionalization objectives.   
 
As mentioned above, few entry-level analysts are true “experts” in their fields 
when they are hired since they are neophytes in the discipline and still have 
much to learn.  Thus, agencies need to know if such applicants have the 
capacity to deepen their expertise and have sufficient intellectual curiousity 
and drive that will ensure their success in the future.  Some way of measuring 
such characteristics would be useful.34  Similar to the Foreign Service, 
applicants might be asked to take a standardized test to see what prospective 
analysts know about the world; this might be used in conjunction with any 
specific academic discipline that they would bring to intelligence analysis. 
Furthermore, the entrance exam could include questions regarding their 
research and work styles to give recruiters a better feel for their abilities to 
conduct research and collaborate in analytic teams.   
 
Testing analysts, once hired, has never really been part of the analytic culture. 
On-the-job training through “doing analysis” and being observed and 
evaluated by peers and supervisors has been the sole measure of whether an 
analyst is progressing in his or her development.  This “trial” or 
“probationary” period of time is used to determine if an analyst has what it 
takes, but is often fairly subjective.  Likewise, many training courses offered 
by intelligence agencies are still non-graded.  That is to say, the analysts 
typically pass by merely showing up and signing in.  There is little effort to 
determine whether they have learned anything.  A more empirical basis for 
evaluating analysts’ proficiency in conducting analysis is now in order.   
 
A first step is to adopt, as military service colleges and military intelligence 
curricula do, training programs that include evaluation standards.  Some have 
letter grades, while others adopt the philosophy that a student has “met” the 
standards expected or was “above” or “below” them.  Constructing course 
evaluation standards, which would be included in an analyst’s annual fitness 
report, would incentivize more engagement in training and education 
opportunities as well as give supervisors a stronger basis for promoting or not 
                                                     
34 One study identifies core competencies for intelligence analysts in four areas:  abilities, 
characteristics, knowledge, and skills.  See David Moore and Lisa Krizan, “Core 
Competencies for Intelligence Analysts at at the National Security Agency,” in Russell 
Swenson (ed.), Bringing Intellignce About:  Adding Value to Information in the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (Washington DC, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), pp. 
81-113; cited in Mark Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Analysts,” in Analyzing 
Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, p. 307. 
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promoting analysts.  In skills-based training, there should be a way to 
measure whether an analyst can actually employ an analytic technique or not; 
similarly, in more seminar-style courses or simulations, instructors should be 
able to evalute how well or poorly an analyst contributes, collaborates, and 
leads in a group setting.    
 
Whatever system of standards is adopted, it should be tied directly to the 
kinds of tasks analysts are likely to face, and those standards should then 
drive the development of curricula.  Some intelligence analysis schools believe 
they achieve this by sending “seasoned” analysts to become instructors in 
their basic analyst courses.  However, such analysts may not necessarily be 
the best teachers, even if they have come from the analytic front lines.  
Instead, intelligence schools and the NIU should be looking for instructors 
who have had practical analytical experience but also who are both interested 
and talented in instructing. 
 
Once a set of standards in both training as well as in analytic performance is 
well established, a certification program will become more achievable and 
acceptable.  Without micro-managing every agency, the ODNI should be able 
to articulate basic, journeyman, and senior analyst skill levels, which are also 
tied to the completion of a comparable set of training and education courses 
as well as to a production history that reflects progressively more 
sophisticated understanding of intelligence analysis in the analyst’s 
occupational discipline.  To this we add policy and operational impact when 
the analyst reaches that level. 
 
Conclusions: Analysis and Policy 
The foregoing discussion has suggested that professionalizing analysis will 
advance proficiency, expertise, and ultimately the quality of the analysis we 
provide to policymakers.  Good analysts will have a “prepared mind” to deal 
with their own cognitive biases, and also pierce the shroud of secrecy and 
deception which adversaries use to obscure or distort their intentions and 
capabilities.  Preparing both analysts and their organizations to overcome 
these hurdles to good analysis is the best way to avert new strategic surprises 
and intelligence failures, and better serve intelligence customers.  Since 2001 
the United States has not suffered another attack on a scale of 9/11, or an 
intelligence blunder on the scale of the 2002 Iraq WMD NIE.  But there is no 
guarantee that such events could not occur tomorrow.  While most 
policymakers will take little interest in how the intelligence community 
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prepares itself today, they will most certainly hold analysts and agencies 
accountable for tomorrow’s surprises.  
 
Among the obstacles that face the recommendations urged here, two are 
prominent: Scarce resources, and organizational cultures which do not fully 
embrace the more rigorous training and education vital to professionalization.  
In the first case, budget cuts historically fall hardest on those elements 
deemed less critical or immediate.  Perhaps inevitably, training and education 
throughout the U.S government—and most assuredly in intelligence—is 
usually an early victim of downturns in agency budgets, and any monies for 
new training programs are also slashed in favor of higher priority projects 
deemed to satisfy immediate needs or have greater visibility with 
policymakers.  Unlike the military services that steadily assign a sizable 
proportion of their forces to training and education no matter the spikes in 
manpower demands, intelligence agencies typically view training as a 
nuisance or distraction rather than an investment in professionalization.  In 
the IC, analysts often cannot be spared for training when they are in short 
supply relative to perceived insatiable consumer demands for greater 
production.  This subordination of training and education to putative higher 
priorities is partly explained by organizational cultures which have not 
traditionally valued education.   
 
Since most analysts come to their jobs with some subject matter expertise, 
managers often presume they will learn whatever else they need “on the job” 
just as they did.  On-the-job training throughout the IC historically trumps 
formal training and education both inside and outside the IC.  This cultural 
bias reinforces a sense that training and education is properly a secondary 
priority.  Moreover, agencies’ perennial insularity from academe fosters poor 
understanding about educational opportunities to improve such professional 
skills as critical thinking and even subject matter expertise.  Both of these 
hurdles, resource competition and cultural resistance, will need to be 
overcome if the professionalization of analysis is to advance.  
 
In the end, the measure of the analytic profession’s performance is assessed 
by how its results are received and used.    We hasten to suggest that without 
further professionalization the intelligence community is more at the mercy of 
partisan and bureaucratic politics, which can increase the misuse and 
misrepresentation of intelligence analysis.  The intelligence controversies 
swirling around the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 Iraq WMD estimate painfully 
remind us how blame for policy failures can be left at the doorstep of 
intelligence analysts when their professional skills have been found wanting.  
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In concert with demonstrated competence levels in the more mature 
professions such as medicine is the adoption of a code of ethics.35  Intelligence 
analysis needs such a code, not only to ensure the integrity and cognitive 
neutrality of analysis, but also to help shield analysts from later accusations 
when they’ve done their professional level best to deliver accurate, reliable, 
and objective results, no matter the policy stakes involved.     
 
While intelligence failures are sure to happen, the development of more 
professional skills, and standards of conduct that go with them, will mitigate 
the chances that poor analytic tradecraft or lapses in integrity will be at the 
center of those future controversies.  As one scholar has put it, politicization 
of intelligence is most likely to occur when intelligence is important to 
national security policies.36  It is a safe bet that U.S. intelligence analysis on 
the current pressing issues apart from terrorism—e.g., Iran’s nuclear 
program, along with that of North Korea, or the mess in Syria, the Middle 
East, and indeed, political unrest in any number of key countries—will also 
remain important and sometimes controversial as those judgments will be 
based on limited information and shrouded in the secrecy and deception used 
by such states.  Often assessments must rest on important assumptions that 
analysts are required to make about those foreign actors and their activities.  
The more transparent, rigorous, and open-minded analysts can be with 
policymakers about the limitations of their knowledge and insight, the better 
informed will be U.S. decisions and associated risks regarding those 
programs.   
 
Similarly, the rise of China—potentially America’s next peer economic, if not 
military, rival—will bedevil U.S. strategists, making them frustrated at times 
with the limits of what we can know about Beijing’s intentions and 
capabilities.  Most likely, the debate over China is going to heat up, placing 
intelligence at the center of those debates over the proper U.S. response 
(containment, engagement, or something inbetween).  Thus, adopting the 
highest professional standards for analysis, maintaining analytic integrity, 
and being as candidly self-critical of our performance as our critics can 
sometimes be will help safeguard the intelligence community’s credibility 
with the American public and future administrations.  The future is too 
uncertain and too important to expect anything less from our intelligence 
community.   
  
                                                     
35 Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 129. 
36 Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).  
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